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ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL TO THE
COMPENSATION PLAN*
By Samuel H. Hofstadter'
Congestion of calendars is not a new evil. Resentment of the law's
delay is probably as ancient as law itself. Magna Carta refers to itShakespeare expands on it. Rabelais' description of the slow ripening of
a lawsuit is as much social comment as it is human comedy.
But our courts have come a long way. Procedural reforms have modi-'
fled their fundamental approach and touched the substance of the law.
By a continuous process of self-evaluation in the light of need, the common law, originating in a controlled landed feudalism, has evolved to
meet the requirements of modern society. The business community is
competently served in our courts; the individual citizen finds in them
the guardian of his civil liberties. In one area only have our courts
failed to keep pace with the times-and that is in actions to recover
damages from personal injuries arising out of automobile accidents.
THE PROBLEM

Whereas our Equity, Contract and Non-Jury Tort Calendars are current, the Tort Jury Calendars in the First Department-and elsewhere
in New York-remain years behind.1 And all this despite pre-trial
procedures, transfers to lower courts, a medical panel,2 free assignment
of justices, rules of preference, and consolidation of law and equity
calendars. Unfortunately, these procedural .modifications-excellent expedients-do not reach the heart of the problem. Its enormity becomes
obvious when we realize that personal injury cases in the New York
courts constitute 80 per cent of the Trial Calendar and represent in turn
35 per cent of all personal injury actions throughout the nation. From
thirty to fifty per cent of all such actions arise from automobile accidents.
* The substantial text of this article appeared in the New York Law Journal, Archibald
R. Watson, Editor, March 13, 14 and 15, 1956, and is reprinted with permission. Justice
Hofstadter has kindly consented to document this study for publication in the Quarterly.
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead p. 74, for biographical data. In formulating this
plan, the author has been fortunate in the collaboration of Shirley R. Levittan of the
New York Bar, a scholarly lawyer and devoted friend. Such participation included arrangement, research and editing; and the article represents a joint effort to find a solution for
a vexing problem in legal procedures.
1 State Trial Courts of General Jurisdiction, Calendar Status Study, Institute of Judicial
Administration (June 30, 1955).
2 This pilot project is fully described in "Impartial Medical Testimony," A Report by a
Special -Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on the Medical
Expert Testimony Project (1956). The report is summarized in Botein, "Impartial
Medical Testimony," 135 N.Y.L.J. No. 21, p. 4, col. 1 (January 31, 1956).
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Palliatives are ineffectual to cure so large a growth, and for some time
past I have urged the drastic step of a compensation plan for automobile accident cases. 3 The idea is not new; it was first projected forty
years ago.4 It is no longer the distraction of theorists.5 It is an imponderable in every serious discussion of court congestion. Executives,
legislators and judges consider it with respect.6 Some favor it forthwith-in deference to the actuality of things; others, as the only alternative to the abolition of jury trials in civil cases-and at least, in tort
actions. Despite such consideration, neither in New York 7 nor elsewhere
in the United States has a compensation plan for automobile accidents
been adopted.' We must recognize that it is not immediately possible.9
3 Hofstadter, "A Proposed Automobile Accident Compensation Plan," 131 N.Y.L.J. No. 35,
36, p. 4, col. 1 (February 23 and 24, 1954) ; "Traffic Jam in the Courts," New York Times
Magazine, February 21, 1954; "Let's Put Sense in the Accident Laws," Saturday Evening
Post, October 22, 1955. In 1927, as an Assemblyman, the author proposed legislation along
these lines (Int. 747, Pr. A. 776) and in 1931, as a member of the State Senate, introduced
bills calling for a Commission to study the problem. (Int. 351, Pr. S. 361).
4 By Arthur A. Ballantine in 1916.
5 For a closely reasoned evaluation of compensation in automobile accidents see Report of
the Committee, headed by Arthur A. Ballantine and Dean Young R. Smith of Columbia
Law School, to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents (Feb. 1, 1932), addressed
to the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences. This report is summarized in Smith, Lilly and Dowling, "Compensation for Automobile Accidents, A Symposium," 32 Colum. L. Rev. 785 (1932). See also, Suzman, "Motor Vehicle AccidentsProposals for a System of Collective Responsibility Irrespective of Fault," 72 So. Mr. L.J.
374 (1955); Van Voorhis, Address before New York State Bar Association, 135 N.Y.L.J. No.
3, p. 1, col. 4 (Feb. 14, 1956). For an interesting proposal re "voluntary compensation," see
Ehrenzweig, Full Aid Insurance for the Traffic Victim (1955). This monograph has a comprhensive bibliography. A recent study of compensation from a different point of view
also appears in the Economic and Business Bulletin of Temple University, March, 1955.
6 Legislation has been considered in Connecticut, Virginia, Wisconsin and Great Britain.
Senator Zaretski and Assemblyman Katz recently introduced a bill to establish a Commission
to study a Compensation Plan. (S. Int. 314 Pr. 314; A. 1125, A. Pr. 1137 (1955) ). See
also Address to the New Jersey Bar by Gov. Robert B. Meyner, reprinted, 133 N.Y.L.J.
No. 105, p. 4, col. I (May 31, 1955); and Charles E. Clark, "Summary and Discussion of
the Columbia Plan," 135 N.Y.L.J. No. 8, p. 4, col. 1 (Jan. 12, 1956). The latter has a fine
brief bibliography.
7 In 1956 Senator Desmond introduced a bill into the Senate of New York State (S.398,
Int. 398) relating to automobile accident compensation. See also Kaye and Breslow, "Legislation to Replace Adjudication-Planned Compensation for Auto Accident Victims," 35
B.U.L. Rev. 488 (1955) which sets forth a suggested Vehicle Accident Compensation Act.
8 A Compensation Plan was adopted by the Province of Saskatchewan, Canada, in 1946
and as amended is still in operation. Revised Statutes of Saskatchewan, vol. IV, c. 371
(1953). The operation of the plan is discussed pro and con in Fines, "The Saskatchewan
Plan," 3 Fed. Ins. Coun. Q. 51 (1953); Kilroe, "Necessity for Preservation of the Judicial
Process in the Interest of Persons Injured in Automobile Accidents," 25 N.Y.S. B. Bull. 315
(1953); "All Phases of Automobile Insurance," Alberta Legislative Report of Special Committee of the Legislature (1949).
9 Leo S. Kreindler, "Against Automobile Compensation," 12 N.Y. County Lawyers B.
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Up to now our law has refused to recognize the obvious-that automobile accidents are not of the same character as accidents generally,
and cannot be dealt with in the same fashion. They involve special
considerations which place them in a unique category. Indeed, they present a much broader problem than that of finding a remedy for congested court calendars. The alternative proposal-unlike the compensation plan-deals with them in a frame of reference restricted to calendar
congestion.
Industrial and traffic accidents are the two greatest single causes of
accidental injuries. 10 The problem of the industrial accident has been
met by the enactment in all of our forty-eight states of workmen's compensation acts. Underlying this legislation was the recognition that accidents are an inevitable concomitant of modern industry. We have seen
an increase of automobiles in the United States from 15 million in 1923
to 60 million in 1956. The number of automobiles is controlling-liability
hazard has become intrinsically quantitative.From an actuarial standpoint such accidents are unavoidable, for
the fault lies not with man but with the automobile's tremendous potential for mischief in the exigencies and tensions generated by our complex
society on wheels.:" They are as inevitable a concomitant of our mode
of living as is the industrial accident.'
The greater proportion of accident victims belong to the low income
group which can neither afford the burden of trial delay nor the cost of
the accident itself. They are faced not so much with an outright denial
of justice as with its circumvention by economic expediency. Since
society demands the automobile, society should provide an equitable
method of meeting its cost. It is a common burden to be dealt with on a
collective, not an individual, basis. 4
Bull. 32 (1954); Flynn, "Answering Justice Hofstadter-Compensation Is No Solution,"
27 N.Y.S. B. Bull. 406 (1955); Ryan and Greene, "Pedestrianism: A Strange Philosophy,"
42 A.B.A.J. 117 (1956).
10 Grad, "Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation," 50 Colum. L.
Rev. 300 (1950).
11 Kulp, Casualty Insurance, p. 163.

12 Report, Wisconsin Legislative Council, Committee on Motor Vehicle Accidents (1953).
13 James and Dickinson, "Accident Proneness and Accident Law," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 769
(1950); Ehrenzweig, "A Psychoanalysis of Negligence," 47 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 855 (1953);
Bingham, "Psychology and Highway Safety," 30 Scientific Monthly 553 (1930).
14 Re absolute liability in other countries, see Esmein, "Liability in French Law for
Damages Caused by Motor Vehicles," 2 Am. J.Comp. L. 156 (1953); Ussing, "The Scandinavian Law of Torts," 1 Am. J. Comp. L. 359 (1951); Ishimoto, "A Study on the Liability
for Torts," 1 Osaka L. Rev. 47 (1952); Motor Vehicle Damage Compensation Guarantee
Law No. 97, July 29, 1955 (Jidosha Sougai Hosho-Ho). This recent statute was brought
to the attention of the author by Brigadier General Bert E. Johnson, USAF, Staff Judge
Advocate, stationed with the Far East Air Force.
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That compensation as a solution is logically and juridically justifiable
I do not doubt.'8 It would also be socially and economically sound.
Compensation does more than shift the burden of loss; it spreads it,
and through "loss distribution" the group creating the risk carries the
cost-a result that dilutes the financial weight and inures to the benefit
of the community.16
But ingrained conceptual habits of thought and loyalty, avowed and
unconscious, compounded by self-interest, make a compensation plan
impracticable in the immediate future. The plaintiff, avid for large
recoveries, will be reluctant to substitute assured but restricted indemnity on the basis of los§ suffered, for the alluring though ofttimes
illusory prospect of a windfall in the lottery of personal injury litigation.
The lawyer in his zeal not only for monetary return but for the practice
of his skills will be unwilling to abandon the adversary approach for the
administrative procedure of a compensation board. The instinctive group
loyalty of the Bar generally, along with its concern for the economic
well-being of all its members, will support this position. Finally, insurance
carriers-which oppose compulsory insurance,' 7 although carrying 90 per
cent of all risks-will vigorously repel any departure from present
litigatory practice.
Thus, honest convictions clouded by sheer irrelevancies, and understandable self-interest compounded by error, engender the same bitter
antagonism that greeted workmen's compensation, 8 and, at this time at
least, bar a compensation plan which offers a solution of a social problem
in the context of a society out of which it arises. Since "legislatures and
courts move in proud and silent isolation," it is incumbent on us-the
15 In addition to the Columbia Report, supra note 5, see Brown "Automobile Accident
Litigation in Wisconsin: A Factual Study," 10 Wis. L. Rev. 170 (1935); Survey Analysis of
Studied Cases of Victims, Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate Automobile Insurance, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 91 (1938).
16 Marx, "'Motorism' Must Compensate its Victims," 42 A.B.J. 421 (1956).
17 Lilly, "Compulsory Automobile Association Insurance," Compulsory Compensation for
Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Responsibility Laws, Association of Casualty and Surety
Executives (1930). The Massachusetts Plan, in operation over 30 years, is explained in
the California Semi-Final Report of the Interim Committee on Finance and Insurance § 3,
"Automobile Compensation Insurance," (1953). Re compulsory insurance generally, See
Bohlinger, "Which Road for the Uninsured Motorist?" (1951) Ins. L.J. 433; Bolgar,
"Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation," 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 515 (1953); D~ak, "Automobile Accidents, A Comparative Study of the Law of Liability in Europe," 79 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 371 (1930); Marx, "Let's Compensate and Not Litigate," 3 Fed. Ins. Coun. Q. 62
(1953); Moser, "The Financially Irresponsible Motorist," 25 N.Y.S. B. Bull. 326 (1953);
Rosenzweig, "Why Agents and Brokers Oppose Compulsory Automobile Insurance," Ins.
Advocate (February, 1953).
18 Mechem, "Employers Liability," 44 Am. L. Rev. 231 (1910).
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legal profession, Bench and Bar-to propose another method to secure
the desired result-to offer an honorable compromise by pragmatic approach in keeping with the American tradition itself-adaptation of
philosophy of idea to reality of fact. The American community, which
five years ago already passed the million mark in automobile deathsmore than all the deaths of our wars combined'--commands us to
achieve a solution-to adopt a viable plan!
AN
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Hence, I would now offer an alternative proposal. Automobile accident
cases would be assigned to special courts and heard before a three-man
tribunal, composed of a jurist, a layman and a physician, with the principle of comparative negligence substituted for the rule of contributory
negligence.
The alternative proposal of a multiple tribunal, 0 consisting of jurist,
layman and physician, applying a rule of comparative negligence to
measure extent of liability and consequent damage, will, I submit, provide a decent solution for all parties, including the community, without
doing violence to the psychological climate in which we live. Sole negligence as predicate of liability is modified, but strict liability is avoided.
And a collective, mixed judgment-as in the conventional jury trial-is
retained to a degree in a juridical, not an administrative, forum, which
can dispatch cases with speed relatively equal to that of a court without
a jury.
As the first element of the plan,. the doctrine of contributory negligence
must be discarded in favor of comparative negligence, though the concept of liability based on fault is retained.
CONTRIBUTORY V. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

Contributory negligence has little basis in logic or legal history. It was
21
a creature of social policy rather than a reasoned outgrowth of the law.
30 James and Law, "Compensation for Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too Little
and Too Late," 26 Conn. BJ. 70 (1952). In the first six months of 1955, personal injury
automobile accidents reached 62,761, an increase of 91 over the same period the year
previous. The number of traffic deaths during the period was 933 and property damage aggregated $50,382,420.
20 The proposal of a multiple tribunal is not new; see McNiece and Thornton, "Automobile Accident Prevention and Compensation," 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 585 (1952); but cf.
Templar, "Doctrine of Comparative Negligence," 18 Kan. Jud. Coun. Bull. 148 (1944).
The usual component of suggested multiple tribunals has been a three judge bench.
21 William, joint Torts and Contributory Negligence (1951); James, "Contributory
Negligence," 62 Yale L.J. 691 (1953); Malone, "The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence," 41 I1. L. Rev. 151 (1946); Philbrick, "Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases,"
99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 572 (1951).
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Negligence of itself did not exist in early common law, where strict
liability was the rule. It was only in later evolution that negligence be22
gan to be generally recognized as a separate basis of tort liability. It
was stimulated by the increased number of industrial accidents and the
invention of the railroad. Infant industry, struggling for a foothold in
our society, required protection for financial expansion. As a matter of
social policy, then, the burden of strict liability-of acting at one's peril
-was gradually abandoned in personal injury liability proper. It survived, in a sense, being inverted and transferred to the victim by embodiment in the concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar
against any recovery. In rationalizing this involution many theories have
been advanced to explain the defense of contributory negligence: 23 that
it has a penal basis to punish the plaintiff for his own misconduct; that
plaintiff's conduct is an intervening cause between defendant's negligence
and result; that it will prevent accidents by inducing each member of
society to act with care. In its essence, however, it is an expression of
the highly individualistic attitude of early common law, compounded
by then existent public policy influenced by industrial and economic
need. With the change in social viewpoint in the last century, and the
disappearance of the protective motive that brought it into being, it is
high time that the applicable law be modified. "It is revolting to have
no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time
of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past."2 4
Freedom from fault in the slightest degree as a prerequisite to indemnity is a "complete fantasy '2 5 in the light of present conditionsapart from inevitability, most accidents are the result not of wrongdoing
but of inadvertence or poor judgment on both sides. This has been recog22 While some disagree, it is widely held that negligence grew out of the action on the
case and the disintegration of the old common law writs. See Holdsworth, History of English Law 375 et seq. (1937); Winfield, "History of Negligence in the Law of Torts," 42 L.Q.
Rev. 184 (1926) ; McNiece and Thornton, "Is the Law of Negligence Obsolete?" 26 St. Johns
L. Rev. 255 (1951). See also foreign works: Esser, Grundiagen und Entwicklung der
Gefshrdungshaftung (1941); Strahl, Farberedande Utrendning angfende Lagstiftnung pi
Skadestindstrgttens Omride (1950).
23 Lord Halsbury, L.C. in Wakelin v. London and S.W. Ry., 12 A.C. 41 (1896); Bohlen,
"Contributory Negligence," 21 Harv. L. Rev. 233 (1907); Lowndes, "Contributory Negligence," 22 Geo. L.J. 674 (1934); Schofield, "Davies v. Mann: The Theory of Contributory
Negligence," 3 Harv. L. Rev. 263 (1889).
24 Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897).
25 Peck, "The Complement of Court and Counsel," Thirteenth Cardozo Lecture of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 9 Record 272 (1954).
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nized by layman and professional alike.20 Rejecting the harshness of the
rule which offends their innate sense of justice, juries circumvent what
someone has called "the judicial nonsense" of contributory negligence,
and the plaintiff gets damages based on crude "kangaroo" adjustments.
Even judges disesteem the doctrine; it was branded by Justice Peck as
"barbaric. ' 27
Indeed, the concept has long been discarded in other fields of the law.
The Federal Employer Liability Act at an early date abandoned contributory negligence as a bar to recovery. The Merchant Marine Act
(Jones), the Death on the High Seas Act, state railway labor acts and
admiralty law generally have all substituted the principle of comparative
negligence for the contributory rule. In the common-law personal injury
action itself, comparative negligence has found surreptitious acceptance
by means of the doctrines of "last clear chance"2 and of "active and
passive tort" feasors. Resort to such obliquities is deleterious to law
generally. We should be prepared to face up squarely to the concept of
apportionment of fault and, by allowing it in the front door, to obviate
the practice of subversion of the law at the back entrance.3 0
Unsuccessful attempts to enact comparative negligence legislation have
been made for several years in our State Legislature.3 Each of the bills
introduced a "diminution of damage" type of comparative negligence
with varying degrees of responsibility barring recovery. In some, the
power to apportion damages was vested in the court; in others, in the
triers of the fact. Provision was also made for multiple-party suits.
In the areas in which comparative negligence already operates, the
apportionment of damages is governed by different criteria. American
admiralty courts have adopted the arbitrary practice of dividing the total
damages equally between the parties.32 Such a rule of thumb is obviously
inequitable, and all other leading maritime countries base apportionment
26 Leflar, "The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence," 1 Ark. L. Rev. 1 (194647); Thornton and McNiece, "Torts," 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 692 (1954).
27 Peck, Report on Justice (Feb. 5, 1953).
28 James, "Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine," 47 Yale L.J. 704 (1938); MacIntyre, "The Rationale of Last Clear Chance," 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1225 (1940).
29 McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952); Bohlen,
"Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors," 21 Conn. L.Q. 552 (1936).
30 For an extensive bibliography on the subject of comparative negligence, see "Comparative Negligence," a study by the Institute of judicial Administration.

31 Mitchell-Wilson Bill, S. Int. 2572, Pr. 2741; A. Int. 2835, Pr. 2970 (1955); Cf. various
bills over the years of Senator Williamson and Assemblymen Brook and Teller.
32 Robinson, "Legal Adjustment of Personal Injury in the Maritime Industry," 44 Harv.
L. Rev. 223 (1930).
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on relative fault.3 3 In most of our federal legislation recovery is reduced
in accordance with degree of negligence. In general, the doctrine of
comparative negligence based on proportion of damage is the rule in civil
law areas,3 4 and it is gradually finding its way into common-law jurisdictions. 5 While the problem of apportionment presents certain difficulties, there is no doubt that once the basic doctrine of comparative
38
negligence is accepted, the details of operation can be worked out.

New York, which has always been in the vanguard of progressive
legislation, cannot lag behind in so significant a legal area. It is becoming increasingly evident that the idea of contributory fault is a vestigial
remainder that has no place in automobile accident litigation today.
Opposition may come from some of the legal profession because of tradition and the usual initial inertia to change to which all men are heirs,
but perhaps the principal resistance will be found among the insurance
carriers. While this is understandable, a compromise should, and can,
be reached.
The basis for compromise is to be found in the second element of the
alternative proposal-substituting for a conventional jury trial adjudication by a three-man forum. Just as strenuously as casualty companies
will oppose any modification in the rule of contributory negligence, so
would plaintiffs-and the legion of prospective plaintiffs-vehemently
insist on retaining the principle of trial by jury. Both groups must be
prevailed upon to subordinate, in part, individual interest to the common
good; under the proposal each will be served well. Economically, while
there may be a greater number of recoveries against the carriers, inflated
verdicts for slight damage will be less likely; on the other hand a really
injured plaintiff will be more assured of some recovery despite inevitable
33 Rule established by Brussels Maritime Convention of 1909-10 and incorporated into
the English Maritime Convention Act of 1911.
34 With the exception of Louisiana.
35 In England the Law Reform Act of 1945 substituted comparative negligence for the
common law rule. In Arkansas, Michigan, Nebraska and Wisconsin, the right to recovery
of the contributorily negligent party is dependent upon the relative negligence of plaintiff
and defendant. In Alabama, -Canal Zone, Florida, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina,
Tennessee and Wyoming, indemnity is diminished in accordance with fault. The four
Canadian provinces of British Columbia, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Ontario operate
under a similar system with Ontario providing elaborately for multiple party actions.
Comparative negligence is now also the law of France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Norway and
Sweden. Generally, see Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions
(1936).
36 Mole and Wilson, "A Study of Comparative Negligence," 17 Cornell L.Q. 333 (1931);
Ohlbaum, "The Case for Comparative Negligence," 1 The Advocate 30, 65 (1954). (Contains good discussion of comparative negligence legislation introduced in New York.)
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fault. Both will have the benefit of a collective judgment of a mixed
court.
For pragmatic reasons, my proposal regarding juries is narrower than
other suggestions. First, it is restricted to the trial of automobile cases
only; and, secondly, it contemplates a modification of the conventional
jury trial, not its abolition altogether. For a multiple tribunal is in essence a form of jury trial.
Historically and semantically, "jury," like "court," connotes an agency
of adjudication. Its character is not determined by the precise number
twelve. Grand juries consist of more, Municipal Court juries of less;
and in our own court, sometimes one or more jurors are dispensed with
by agreement to meet the exigencies of trial. Unanimity is no longer
required. There is no magic in the number twelve. What is fundamentally characteristic of the jury forum is its multiple nature. The
alternative proposal retains its basic features in measurable degree.
JURY V. JURIDICAL PANEL

Strictly speaking, therefore, consideration of the abolition of jury
trials in civil cases, generally or even in all tort cases, is not essential to
the present discussion--concerned as we are with a unique category of
litigation, i.e., automobile accident cases. But civilizing and defining the
terms of the discussion is helpful to greater clarity; this has become
more necessary because of the clouds of imprecision which have been
raised.
Let me say at once that in common with the great majority of my
brethren of the Bench, I do not share the distrust of juries expressed
in and outside our profession. We believe that in deciding who is right
and who, is wrong the jury's judgment is as good as, and sometimes apt
37
to be better than, that of the judge.
Our experience in Trial Term has been that in 95 per cent of the cases
the same result is achieved by juries as by the court without a jury. In
Massachusetts, where two concurrent courts operate; one with juries, the
other without, the percentage of plaintiff and defendant verdicts is the
same, as are, in most cases, the amounts of the awards.3" Both as trial
judge and as appellate justice I deprecate greatly the spate of verdicts
set aside by both trial courts and appellate tribunals. "There is no
objective standard to apply . . . the decision must come to rest on the

sense of the judge addressed to the reasonableness of the jury's verdict,
37 Cf. Hartshorne, "Jury Verdicts: A Study of their Characteristics and Trends," 25
A.B.AJ. 113 (1939).
38 Peck, "Report on Justice," February 15, 1953.
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but this in turn is a subjective process strikingly similar to the jury's
own judgment of the facts in the first place.1 39 All too often misgivings
directed at a particular verdict are a reflection of an unconscious suspicion of juries generally. But the judicial system can be as strong as
the trial judge. 40 Judicial leadership based on the instructed intuition of
experience can obviate the necessity of setting aside a verdict. If the
judge retains "creative command" 41 of the course of action, the jury
will instinctively absorb the objective direction it is his function to
provide.
Many agree with G. K. Chesterton: "I would trust twelve ordinary
men, but I cannot trust one ordinary man." In general, most libertarians,
and minority groups in particular, favor jury trials. For greater assurance, their resistance extends against their abolition even in civil casesbecause in their view the best protection against oppression and discrimination is in dilution of authority-or perhaps in widening its base.
Thus, opposition to doing away with jury trials in civil actions is not
restricted to the plaintiffs who oppose such a move specifically in personal injury actions. I strongly hold, myself, that there is no valid
distinction intrinsically between contract and tort actions, and that a
fractured limb should not be accorded different treatment juridically
than a broken promise. As an original matter, if there is abolition of
juries in negligence actions, the same change in practice logically should
be extended to all civil cases.
But the life of the law is not logic but experience-and response to
felt necessity. We have to take a second, hard look at the matter in the
context of automobile accident cases.
Most of the distinguished judges who would dispense with juries in
civil actions, or in tort cases generally, favor such a course not as a
virtue and end in itself. They affirm the soundness of jury judgment.
Primarily, their concern lies in eliminating jury trials as a matter of dissolving the intolerable traffic jam in our courts; the system cannot work
any longer, they hold, in the automobile age, however well it may have
operated in the past. What is brought in question is not its validity, but
its practicality.
As Presiding Justice Peck has repeatedly pointed out,' the process of
39 Rapant v. Ogsbury, 279 App. Div. 298, 109 N.Y.S.2d 737 (3d Dep't 1952).
40 Lymmus, Journal of American Judicature Society (August, 1953).
41 Botein, Address to newly admitted members of the Bar, 131 N.Y.L.J. No. 56, p. 1,
col. 3 (Mar. 24, 1954), quoting from Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, The Mind Alive.
42 Peck, "Crisis in the Courts," address to the Alumni of the Graduate Schools, Harvard
University, June 15, 1955; "Do Juries Delay Justice?" New York Times Magazine, Dec. 25,
1955; Address to New York County Lawyers Association, Dec. 10, 1953; "The Pillar of
Justice," January 14, 1952.
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jury trial in personal injury actions, more than any other factor, is the
root of delay in the courts. One hundred and eight jurors are required to
do the work of one judge, and it takes three times as long to try a case
with a jury as it does with a judge. The average cost to the public of a
jury trial is $3,000 per case; nor does this figure reflect the payment to
lawyers of waiting time and the cost of the public in increased insurance
premiums.4 3 But pragmatically, the profligacy of time and moneywhich might be justified were the desired results obtained-has failed the
individual and society. As a result of adherence to the present jury system, with its concomitant delay and expense, litigants are kept from our
courts and verdicts as finally rendered "lose their equity."
It is not jurors who are at fault; it is the automobile giving rise to the
inevitable accident and its sequel of the present conventional jury trial.
It is desirable to restrict the discussion to that frame of reference. If
the modification here proposed works well, it can be extended to other
personal injury actions.
Actually, we need not reach the question of dispensing with juries in
civil actions generally. The need for such innovation may never arise, if
the present proposal is adopted. There are those, however, so devoted
to the principle of trial by jury that they are apprehensive lest any
change in the present system lead to the drastic result of their elimination altogether. Even in contemplating such a possible contingency,
these honorable adherents of trial by jury owe to themselves and to others
not so minded-but equally well disposed-a judicious assessment of the
system in civil trials which must not be based on an illusory analysis
of motive, but must begin with a historical examination of the matter.
"A page of history is worth a volume of logic."
Whereas trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to Anglo-American jurisprudence, in civil actions the right to jury trials is something of
an historical accident.44 In criminal cases it became a symbol of liberty,
and the philosophic forerunners of the French Revolution hailed it as a
"badge of freedom." The right to a jury exists in most European states
today, but confined to criminal prosecutions. Actually the origin of the
jury system is not rooted in the rise of democracy, but was introduced
into England by the Norman kings and can be traced back to the Ro43
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mans, in whose hands it served quite a different purpose, as its original
title, inquisitio, grimly suggests. The procedure as a method of invoking
the aid of yeoman of the vicinage was transferred to England, where
its early use was in such administrative matters as the compilation of
the Domesday Book. This was the epoch of trial by battle and ordeal
and of the wager of law. The oath in the Middle Ages had a
mystique of its own, and the body of neighborhood freemen were called
on not only to give testimony out of their own knowledge but to swear
to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Over the centuries these compurgators became transformed into triers of the fact. During the absolutist reign of the Tudors the jury became a safeguard against the
oppression of the crown as exercised in the Courts of High Commission,
the Star Chamber and the Council of the North, which operated without
juries. The original purpose and development of the jury were lost in
the surge against tyranny. This attitude was carried over to our colonial
period, and popular sentiment for the jury system as a guardian of
liberty still persists. However derived, such public attachment is very
strong. Nevertheless, perhaps those who identify the right in criminal
proceedings and civil actions might be less insistent on the indispensability of a civil jury were they fully aware of the extent to which its use
has been limited. In England-where they originated-civil juries have
been generally eliminated. In our own law impartial administrative
agencies dispense with their use. Matters as important as marriage and
child custody and a whole complex of equity cases are adjudicated without juries within the broad exercise of the court's chancery jurisdiction.
And even criminal cases not involving felonies are tried without jury
in Magistrates' Courts, as well as in Special Sessions-where liberty is in
jeopardy. In many jurisdictions even the most serious crimes are tried
without juries when waived by defendants.
To revert to the accident problem, hard necessity drives us to disregard the purely theoretical considerations otherwise obtaining for not
differentiating between cases. Deadly congestion vindicates a plan which,
though it involves innovations, is not a revolutionary break with the
traditional framework of judicial determination. Compromise is required
in the light of the exigencies of reality. Conventional jury trials must
be modified in automobile accident cases, if our courts are not to be
permanently pervaded with the bleak, obstructive fog of Jarndyce v.
Jarndyce, and not only "Trial by Jury" but the law itself should become
the subject of mockery-and in less kindly hands than the Savoyards.
The opponents of comparative negligence and the protagonists of the
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present mode of trial must each yield some ground and settle on a plan
which would inure to the benefit of the community.
And it is the legal profession which must assume leadership in formulating the decision.4 5 Heretofore, lawyers, including judges, have not
been conspicuous in achieving legal reforms. In common with other
specialized groups, callings and professions, we are afflicted by vis inertia
due, not so much perhaps to self-interest as, to loyalty to caste transmuted into collective self-esteem which inhibits recognition of need for
elimination or even modification of prevailing institutions and methods.
BENEFITS OF THE PLAN

The proposal of a three-judge tribunal would go far in winning over
adversaries of comparative negligence and of change in trial by jury.
It is my long-standing conviction that legislative, popular and professional support for the required constitutional amendment to abolish
civil jury trials will never be forthcoming unless, at least, multiple judges
constituting a court were substituted. But I have believed that a threejudge court plan, conditioned on comparative negligence, would prevail
by reason of the legal and social emergency generated by court congestion. For compelling reasons the plan provides for the inclusion of a
layman and a physician on the Bench.
By having only one jurist we conserve judicial manpower. Then again:
in the appraisal of facts-and personal injury actions present largely
issues of fact-not of law-the leavening impact of lay thinking is most
salutary to counteract the over-professionalism that is inevitable in any
specialized calling.46 And impartial medical guidance-not advocacyin personal injury litigation is requisite, as has been demonstrated by the
pioneer operation of the medical report office in our department. We use
experts in fields other than the judicial, why not in the area of judicial
decision? The inclusion of a physician is an extension of the medical
panel, which has already proved its worth. If objective testimony is essential to an appraisal on the merits, how much more effective, in decision, would be the presence of an impartial physician on the Bench.
Medico-jurisprudence is a study in itself, and the support of a 4qualified
7
physician-expert as part of this tribunal would be invaluable.
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(Dec. 12, 1955); Heck, "The Duty of the Legislature to Improve the Courts," 135 N.Y.L.J.
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Claims for veterans' disability pension are adjudicated by Veterans
Administration Rating Boards. Each rating board consists of three
members: a doctor, a lawyer and the third is the lay or industrial member. What the American people regard as good for their veterans would
be good, too, for all.
The jurists in the special courts--erected by constitutional amendment-would be drawn from already existing courts-from time to time;
no new judges would be required. They would be called by the Appellate
Division from any court, civil or criminal, less burdened than others,
within each department-and, by arrangement, from other departments
as well. In our own, a vast pool would be provided by Magistrates',
Municipal, Domestic Relations, Special Sessions, County, City, General
Sessions and Supreme Courts. Thus, the greatest economy in and widest
use of-statewide use, when necessary-judicial manpower, beyond any
contemplated heretofore, will be effected. Broadened medical panels
would supply the physicians, and jury commissions would be adapted
to furnish the lay judges.
Such a Bench-jurist, physician and layman-operating under a rule
of comparative negligence and limited to automobile accidents would
of itself allay some of the doubt of the opponents of the separate component parts of the plan. For the lawyer it would have the advantage of
maintaining the adversary as against the administrative system, and it
would provide a judicial and not a board determination. To the plaintiff
the multiple court would give the assurance of lay representation on the
tribunal. The comparative negligence rule would eventuate in reasonable
expectation of justifiable recovery rather than a gamble on exaggerated
claim. The defendant (insurance carriers and others) would benefit from
a Bench less inclined to base its judgment on sentiment than on fact.
Both litigants would profit from the presence of a non-partisan physician
as part of the court, limiting, if not altogether eliminating, the unseemly
and confusing rivalry of medical experts. Libertarian and minority
groups would be less disturbed were the elimination of juries restricted
to a limited group of cases-automobile accidents. The judiciary would
take heart from the more expeditious handling of litigation. The community at large would gain immeasurably from the dissolution of the
bottleneck of court congestion. There is no doubt that such a plan would
not only speed the trial process itself, but would also augment the
probability of settlement both before trial and during trial.
Midway between the present mode of adjudication and disposition by
administrative boards, midway between conventional jury trial and trial
by court without a jury, this plan might indicate further moderate
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changes, if partially successful. If substantially successful it would
obviate far more drastic reform. Clearly something must be done; the
present state is intolerable and cannot continue indefinitely. But the
action should be considered and planned to preclude spontaneous, perhaps explosive, results which would surprise us all, especially the contending groups now unwilling to yield a particle of their present advantage and to compose their differences. The law is not a straight jacket,
and the time has come for a fresh approach to this problem in harmony
with our present-day needs.
CONCLUSION

What this alternative proposal supplies are, essentially, procedural
devices fashioned by dire necessity. But even as the great masters have
transmuted law into literature, at times, so the collective judgment and
will of our profession-which is always greater than any of her sonscan present the inspiring phenomenon of form and substance mergingfor the common good.
The resultant increased efficiency of the administration of justice to
the average citizen would enhance justice itself, and would illustrate the
capacity of the American people and their law for accommodation-not
surrender; their genius for honorable compromise, which has kept us
strong in freedom. And solicitude for the ordinary man in the halls of
justice would translate into reality our ideal of the dignity as well as the
equality of the individual.

